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BRIEF OF APPELLEE
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal is authorized by Section 78-2a-3(2)(h) Utah Code
Annotated, as amended in 1992 and by Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Whether the trial court properly determined that when

Donna Watts' purported second marriage was annulled, the marriage
was void ab initio and therefore, for the purposes of the
language of the Decree, to which the husband agreed, no
"marriage"

had taken place.

The standard of review is that

applied to matters of contract interpretation.

This is a

question of applying a given set of facts to the terms of a court
order and the court grants no deference to the trial court's
determination.
2.

Hadow v. Hadow, 707 P.2d 669 (Utah 1985).

Whether the trial court properly determined that an

agreed upon division of property cannot be modified simply
because one party to the agreement subsequently decides the
agreement is inequitable.

This is a question of applying a given

set of facts to a determined legal standard and the court grants
no deference to the trial court's determination.

Hadow v. Hadow.

707 P.2d 669 (Utah 1985).
3.

Whether the trial court properly determined that a

division of property is not analogous to the payment of alimony

for purposes of the application of Utah Code Ann. 30-3-5(5).
This question of the construction of a statute is purely a
question of law for which no deference is given to the lower
court.

Mountain Fuel Supply v. Salt Lake City, 572 P.2d 884

(Utah 1988) .
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Section 3 0-1-2 of the Utah Code provides in part that
The following marriages are prohibited and declared
void:
...

(2) when there is a husband or wife living, from whom
the person marrying has not been divorced;
...

(5) between a divorced person and any person other than
the one from whom the marriage was secured until the
divorce decree becomes absolute, and, if an appeal is
taken, until after the affirmance of the decree.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
On April 20, 1983, Plaintiff-Appellee Donna Watts ("Donna")
was granted a default divorce from her husband DefendantAppellant Wesley Watts (the "Husband") pursuant to a Decree of
Divorce (the "Decree").

R. 18-20.1

initiated by the Husband.

The present proceeding was

He filed an Order to Show Cause

seeking to hold Donna in contempt for not paying him $24,000.
He claimed this payment was required by the Decree.

R. 38-39.

The Husband also filed a Petition to Modify the Divorce Decree
seeking to modify the Decree to require that Donna pay him
$24,000 within sixty days.
1

R. 29-32.

R

The Husband claimed in

* P* _• will designate the page number of the Record on
Appeal on which support for the preceding facts may be found.
2

his Order to Show Cause and Petition to Modify the Decree that
the Decree required Donna to pay him $24,000 within six years of
her remarriage.

R. 29 & 36.

He claimed this condition was

satisfied by a purported marriage Donna had entered into with
Denna Landon Scott ("Scott").

R. 29-30 & 33.

been annulled and adjudged void ab initio.

This marriage had

R. 50-51.

On October 30, 1992, following a hearing, the Third District
Court Domestic Relations Commissioner recommended that the
Husband's motions for contempt and for an order requiring payment
of $24,000 be denied on the grounds that the money was not due
since the remarriage to Scott had been declared null and void.
R. 56-57.

The Husband filed an objection to this recommendation

with Third District Judge J. Dennis Frederick.

R. 76-79.

The

objection filed by the Husband was untimely being filed beyond
the ten day limit established by Rule 6-204 (4) of the Code of
Judicial Administration.

Judge Frederick accepted the

Commissioner's recommendation and entered an order reflecting the
recommendation on November 23, 1992.

R. 8 0-81.

Statement of Facts
In 1983 Donna sought a divorce from the Husband.
divorce was not contested.

R. 2-6.

The

Donna and the Husband agreed

to the terms upon which the divorce would be granted including
the division of the marital property.

R. 8-9.

The Husband

agreed that Donna, as part of the division of property, would
keep the marital residence.

R. 3 & 8.

As his portion of the

equity in the residence, the Husband agreed to accept the sum of
3

$24,000.00.

The Husband also agreed that Donna would only be

obligated to pay this amount upon the occurrence of one of two
conditions.

The Husband agreed that Donna would not have to pay

the $24,000.00 until the house was sold or six years after Donna
remarried.

R. 3 & 8.

The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law and the Decree incorporated this agreement between Donna and
the Husband.

R. 16 & 19.

On August 8, 1986, Donna thought she married Denna Landon
Scott.

R. 58

3.

Before the purported marriage, Scott disclosed

that he had been married previously but that marriage had ended
in divorce.

R. 47. A few weeks after the marriage, however,

Donna discovered that the divorce had never been finalized.
58.

R.

She determined that Scott was legally incapable of being

married because he was already married to another woman.

On

October , 1986, shortly after her discovery, Donna filed an
action to have her "marriage" to Scott annulled because Scott was
legally incapable of being married.

R. 62-65.

Donna also sought

a restraining order restraining Scott from, among other things,
entering into her home or place of business.

R. 67-68.

The

restraining order was granted for the pendency of the annulment
action and Scott was prohibited from entering Donna,s home or
place of business and from molesting, abusing and physical,
touching Donna. R.68-69.
Donna was also successful in the annulment action.

The

court found that Scott had been married at the time he attempted
to marry Donna and concluded that the purported marriage to Scott
4

was void.

R. 47-48.

Donna's "marriage" to Scott was annulled by

order of the Third Judicial District Court on October 20, 1987.
R. 50-51.

The Husband was informed of the annulment proceeding

at the time it occurred.

R. 59.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

Donna's prior marriage to Scott was annulled meaning

that it was declared void ab initio.

The effect of an annulment

is to treat the marriage as if it had never occurred.

If the

marriage is treated legally as if it had never occurred, it
cannot be the basis for triggering a duty to make payments under
a prior divorce decree.
2.

The Decree reflects the agreement of the parties

concerning the division of the property of the parties7 marriage.
The division of property to which the Husband assented cannot be
changed by the court simply because the Husband now thinks the
agreement is not fair.

Equity is not available to the Husband to

alter the terms of his agreement simply because he is unhappy
with it.
The Husband's complaint seeking to modify the divorce decree
was properly dismissed because he alleged no changed
circumstances supporting his request to modify the Decree.
Although the courts do retain jurisdiction to modify decrees, the
power to do so is limited to situations in which there has been a
substantial change of circumstances.

When one party seeks to

change an agreed-to property division the courts should make a
5

change only if the substantial change demonstrates compelling
reasons for making the modification.

The Husband's complaint

seeking modification was therefore legally insufficient since it
claimed no changed circumstances, only the fulfillment of one of
the conditions of the Decree,
3.

A division of property is not an award of alimony and

should not be treated as such.

The Utah statutes respecting

alimony and annulments clearly apply only to alimony, not to
agreed upon property divisions.

There is no rational basis on

which to claim that an agreed upon property division is analogous
to the payment of alimony.

The provisions of the Decree should

not, therefore, be treated like an order to pay alimony.

ARGUMENT
I.
A MARRIAGE DECLARED TO BE VOID CANNOT BE THE TRIGGERING
EVENT FOR A DIVISION OF PROPERTY
The Husband wants Donna to pay him $24,000 because, he says,
the Decree requires it.

The Decree provides that Donna is to pay

this sum six years after she remarries.

The initial question to

be asked is whether Donna remarried more than six years ago.
answer to that question is no she did not.

The

The law in Utah

concerning annulled marriages is quite clear.

fl

[I]n the case of

an annulment, the judgment is that there was never a valid
marriage."
(1960).

Cecil v. Cecil, 11 Utah 2d 155, 158, 356 P.2d 279

That is the marriage is treated as void.

Section 30-1-2

of the Utah Code provides that
The following marriages are prohibited and declared
6

void:
(2) when there is a husband or wife living, from whom
the person marrying has not been divorced;
•• •

(5) between a divorced person and any person other than
the one from whom the marriage was secured until the
divorce decree becomes absolute, and, if an appeal is
taken, until after the affirmance of the decree.
Donna's purported marriage to Scott was annulled as a
violation of Utah law and was declared void ab initio.
treated as if it had never taken place.
treatment of an annulled marriage.

It was

This is the proper

If the marriage never

happened, there was no event to trigger the requirement to pay
$24,000 to the Husband.
The Husband acknowledges this treatment of an annulled
marriage by not challenging the decision of the court below on
these grounds.

The Husband argues exclusively that the court

should have modified the Decree to require Donna to pay him
$24,000 thus tacitly acknowledging that under the Decree as
presently written, no obligation to pay the $24,000 exists.

The

decision of the lower court should be affirmed.
II. THE PROPERTY DIVISION DONNA AND THE HUSBAND AGREED TO
CANNOT BE ALTERED SIMPLY BECAUSE THE HUSBAND IS NOW UNWILLING TO
ABIDE BY ITS TERMS
Since it is clear that under the terms of the Decree as
written, Donna need not pay the money requested by the Husband,
the Husband wants the court to change the language of the Decree.
He seeks to do so either because the Decree is inequitable or
because circumstances have changed.
7

Neither of these rationale

support the Husband's contention.
The same arguments asserted by the Husband in this case were
considered and rejected by this Court in Whitehouse v.
Whitehouse. 790 P.2d 57 (Utah App. 1990).

In Whitehouse, the

divorcing parties had agreed to language which gave the husband a
conditional equity interest in the marital home provided the wife
sold the home or remarried within 7 1/2 years from the entry of
the decree of divorce.

The husband in that case asked the court

to change the decree to provide that the equity in the home would
be due and payable when the wife remarried, sold the home, or 7
1/2 years from the date of the decree, whichever came first.

The

lower court agreed and changed the decree.
This court reviewed that decision and reversed.

In its

decision, this court addressed the contention made here that the
provision of the decree was inequitable and therefore should be
changed.

This court noted in Whitehouse that "equity should not

be used as a lever to realign rights and privileges ^voluntarily
contracted away simply because one has come to regret the bargain
made.'

Whitehouse at 61, quoting Lea v. Bowersf 658 P.2d 1213,

1215 (Utah 1983), quoting, Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248, 1250-51
(Utah 1980).
In this case the Husband and Donna both agreed that the
Husband's equity interest in the home would "be paid to him w} ^n
the home is sold or six years after the Plaintiff remarries."
The Husband now claims that leaving this language in the Decree
is inequitable and wants the language changed.
8

The situation is

precisely that addressed by this court in Whitehouse and the
result should be the same.
division.

The parties agreed to the property

The Husband's claim that the agreement he struck is

not equitable is simply not sufficient to disturb that agreement.
As in Whitehouse, the Husband here has also claimed that the
Decree should be modified.

He points out, correctly, that the

court maintains jurisdiction over actions such as this in order
to make continuing adjustments to the decree as the need arises.
However, the power of the court to change the Decree is strictly
limited.

A decree may only be modified when there has been a

substantial change in circumstances.

What's more if the

modification sought relates to an agreed upon division of
property, as is the case here, the party seeking modification
must demonstrate "compelling reasons arising from a substantial
and material change in circumstances."

Whitehouse at 61, quoting

Foulger v. Foulaer, 626 P.2d 412, 414 (Utah 1981).

The Husband

instead alleged no change of circumstances at all.

There is not

one word in the Husband's petition which relates to how the
parties' circumstances may differ now from when the divorce was
finalized.
In support of his argument the Husband cites a number of
cases from surrounding jurisdictions because, as he admits, there
is no Utah case law which supports his argument.

Thus the

Husband relies on Koelsch v. Koelsch, 713 P.2d 1234 (Ariz. 1986);
Hardin v. Hardin, 788 P.2d 1252 (Ariz. App. 1990); and Chrane v.
Chrane, 649 P.2d 1384 (N.M. 1982).
9

None of these cases is

applicable to the issue at hand because in all of these cases the
courts were addressing decrees which had been imposed upon the
parties by the court after litigation of the matters.

Thus in

each of these cases when the appeals courts examined the equities
of the decrees the courts were adjudging the propriety of the
actions of the trial court.

In this case the parties themselves

agreed to the provisions of the Decree and this court has
emphatically stated that it will not look behind such an
agreement of the parties.
Thus the Husband has not even alleged the minimum facts
required for a modification of a decree much less facts which
show compelling reasons for a modification arising from a
substantial an material change of circumstances.

Under the

Whitehouse case, the order of the court below must be upheld.
III. THE DIVISION OF PROPERTY AT ISSUE IN THIS CASE IS NOT
ANALOGOUS TO THE PROVISION OF ALIMONY
The Husband has maintained that the circumstances
surrounding the annulment of Donna's prior "marriage" should be
treated as if the issue were the continuation of alimony under
Utah Code Ann. 30-3-5(5).

There is, however, no basis for

treating an award of alimony the same as an order of property
division and the Husband gives no reasons why they should be
treated the same.

Indeed, as has been indicated above, the

statutory approach is to make the alteration of an agreed upon
property settlement much more difficult than the alteration of
the payment of alimony.
Section 30-3-5(5) applies to alimony only.
10

If the

legislature had intended that the section apply to property
divisions it could cerrainly have so provided.

Absent the

legislative application and any reasons why the two events should
be treated the same in the event of an annulment, the statute
must have no application in this instance.

The order of the

District Court should be upheld.
CONCLUSION
Donna's annulled marriage to Scott cannot be used as the
basis for requiring Donna to pay the Husband money the Decree
declares to be due after Donna's remarriage.

The Husband tacitly

acknowledges this by arguing that the Decree must be changed to
require Donna to make the $24,000 payment.

However, the Husband

has presented no grounds upon which the Decree can or should be
modified.

The order of the court below should be upheld in all

respects.
DATED this

//^>

day of July, 1993.
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